See exactly what a record says.
Two examples, nothing hidden: a real GOVP-1 record read field by field with its verification reproduced, then a multi-source claim carried through the sources layer and the trust model to a recomputable conclusion.
A GOVP-1 record, field by field
This is conformance vector 01-valid-document — a real, signed record that passes the verifier. Every field is human-readable and self-describing.
| Version | The wire-format version. GOVP-1 is the current format. |
| Canonical | The URL that binds the record to its issuing domain. A verifier can fetch and pin it; a record cannot be re-hosted under a different identity without detection. |
| Publisher | The declaring domain identity. |
| Asset-Type / Asset-ID | What kind of thing is fixed (document, dataset, model, agent…) and its stable identifier. |
| Asset-SHA256 | The content fingerprint of the declared asset. Present the asset and the verifier confirms it matches. |
| License | How the published evidence may be reused (here CC-BY-4.0). |
| Profile | The time profile. GOVP-BASIC = issuer-asserted time; RFC 3161 / QTSP profiles anchor it independently. |
| Generated-At | The issuance timestamp (asserted by the issuer under BASIC). |
| GOVP-ID | Derived from the content: GOVP-DOC-39969a54190e. The verifier recomputes it and rejects a mismatch. |
| Public-Key | The issuer's Ed25519 public key (base64), carried in the record so it is self-contained. |
| Signature | The Ed25519 signature over the canonical signing input. |
Reproduce the verification
Canonicalize, hash, verify. The signing-input hash is pinned by the conformance suite, so any correct implementation lands on the same bytes.
A multi-source claim, end to end
A single record proves one declaration. Here a claim — "battery cell lot BC-5521 passed end-of-line test" — is corroborated by four heterogeneous signals. Each is verified by the rules of its type before it counts; only verified signals feed the trust calculation and the conclusion.
| Source | Type verifier checks | Independent? | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| Build attestation | in-toto signature; origin authorized in the anchor registry; provenance intact | Yes — CI vendor | verified |
| Calibration certificate | lab signature; certificate within validity window; not revoked | Yes — external lab | verified |
| End-of-line sensor | device signature; reading in range; anchor authorization; freshness | Partly — same plant | verified |
| Firmware bill | signature valid, but the signing anchor was withdrawn | — | revoked |
| Operator note | present but carries no verifiable signature | — | declared_only |
From signals to a conclusion
What this proves: that three independent signals of their stated types passed authentic, authorized, in-date verification and corroborate the claim — not that the cell is physically good. The truth of the value stays with the issuer; GOVP proves the chain of trust behind each signal and how strongly independent sources agree.